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Abstract
This research was aimed at examining just-world beliefs, system justification, authoritarianism, and cognitive style in a nationally
representative sample (N = 1000) in Hungary, and at relating these phenomena to various demographic and political variables
to find out whether the findings in Hungary would differ from its Western counterparts. According to system justification theory,
there is a psychological motive to defend and justify the status quo. This theory has been tested several times in North American
andWestern European samples. The core finding of our study was that Hungarian people, unlike people inWestern democracies,
did not justify the existing establishment. There was strong pessimism with regard to the idea that the system serves the
interests of the people. Members of disadvantaged groups (people with low economic income and/or far right political preference)
strongly rejected the system. System justification beliefs were moderately related to just world beliefs, and there was a significant
relationship between some aspects of need for closure (need for order, discomfort with ambiguity, and closed-mindedness)
and authoritarian beliefs. Need for cognition was only related to one aspect of need for closure: closed-mindedness. The voters
of right-wing parties did not display higher levels of authoritarianism than the voters of the left social-democrat party. The role
of demographic and political variables, limitations, and possible developments of this research are discussed.
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The last decade has witnessed a major erosion of democratic institutions and values in Hungary, one of the most
promising new democracies at the time of the collapse of communism. How can we explain this unexpected pro-
cess? Is Hungary in some way different from well-established democracies? Is it the case that Hungarians, or
more generally Eastern Europeans, think differently from their Western counterparts, and hold to a different set
of social and political values? Do Hungarians display a tendency of “system derogation”: a motivated belief that
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their social and political system is inherently unfair, unjust and corrupt? Our study investigates system derogation,
and the demographic and political variables associated with system derogatory beliefs. In the following, we briefly
introduce the theoretical background of our research, namely the just-world hypothesis, system justification theory,
and the concepts of need for closure, need for cognition, and authoritarianism.
Theoretical Background
According to the just-world hypothesis (Lerner & Miller, 1978), people are motivated to perceive the world as a
just place where people usually get what they deserve. Many studies support the existence of this motivation
(Lerner, 1970, 1977; Lerner & Miller, 1978).
System justification theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994) suggests that people not only believe in the justness of the world
at a general level but also justify the current political, economic, and social establishment. One of the main functions
of justifying the system is that it can help to minimize the unpredictable, unjust, and oppressive nature of social
reality (Jost & Banaji, 1994). Many phenomena that do not conform to the framework of the traditional self and
in-group justification theories can be explained by system justification (e.g., negative in-group stereotypes, out-
group favoritism, working-class conservatism, and the rejection of equity policies by disadvantaged groups; Glick
& Fiske, 2001; Jost, Blount, Pfeffer, & Hunyady, 2003; Jost & Burgess, 2000; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway,
2003a; Jost, Pelham, & Carvallo, 2002). There is a stronger version of the theory which holds that “people who
are most disadvantaged by the status-quo would have the greatest psychological need to reduce ideological dis-
sonance and would therefore be more likely to support, defend, and justify existing social systems, authorities,
and outcomes” (Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, & Sullivan, 2003, p. 13). Jost, Pelham, and colleagues (2003) offer em-
pirical evidence for this stronger version of the theory.
Most of the findings about just-system beliefs come from the analyses of Western European and North American
samples (Jost & Hunyady, 2005). A meta-analysis by Jost, Glaser, and colleagues (2003a) illustrates this very
well: 67 percent of the samples in the database (22,818 cases, 88 samples from 12 countries) came from the
United States, and the rest of the studies were conducted in other Western democracies.
A few studies report the mean level of system justification. The general finding is that the mean level is above the
response scale’s mid-point in theWestern samples. Carter, Ferguson, and Hassin (2011) used the scale developed
by Kay and Jost (2003), and reported a mean level of 5.03 (SD = 1.38) on a nine-point scale. In Jost, Pelham,
and colleagues (2003), on a four-point scale, all subsamples scored significantly above the scale mid-point. The
mean level for Northern Blacks was 2.96, for Northern Whites 3.34, for Southern Whites 3.39, and for Southern
Blacks 3.44. After an experimental manipulation, the mean level of system justification was 4.44 on a nine-point
scale for a U.S. sample (van der Toorn, Berkics, & Jost, 2010).
The few studies concerning the just-world hypothesis and system justification in Eastern European countries –
namely, Hungary and Poland – paint a different picture. Hungarian and Polish people scored lower on just world
beliefs than citizens of Western nations (Doliński, 1991; Sallay & Krotos, 2004; Wojciszke & Dowhyluk, 2006).
The perceived justness of the society and trust in the current establishment are quite low (Kay, Czapliński, & Jost,
2009; van der Toorn et al., 2010; Wojciszke, Baryla, & Mikiewicz, 2008). In the above mentioned study by van
der Toorn and colleagues (2010), the mean level of system justification was 3.81 (on a nine-point scale) for the
Hungarian sample, significantly lower than the mean level of the U.S. sample.
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There are many possible contributing factors to the differences betweenWestern and Eastern European countries.
One factor is the unfinished transition from socialism to capitalism in Eastern European countries (Kluegel & Mason,
2000). The former socialist society was built upon the principles of equality while the new democratic model ad-
vocates merit. The general public in these countries expressed heavy criticism regarding the justness of this new
merit-based system (Fülöp, 2008). Polish and Hungarian citizens seem to be skeptical of the new establishment,
and nostalgia for the former system and justification of the new one may be present at the same time (Jost, Glaser,
et al., 2003b; Kay et al., 2009; van der Toorn et al., 2010).
The difference in social and historical development of Western and Eastern European states and nations is another
possible contributing factor. In theWestern context, the nation and the state overlapped and developed in harmony
with one another, whereas in the Eastern context the nation was organized against the state. The state (system)
was typically led by hostile foreign oppressors such as the Ottoman Turks, the Habsburgs, the Germans, and the
Soviets (László, 2008, 2013). The fact that the establishments in the past typically worked against the members
of the national group can lead to a general distrust and hostile attitude toward the current governmental system,
even under the newly established democratic conditions. This is particularly the case when the society’s expect-
ations for a better life are frustrated in several ways.
Cognitive Style: The Needs for Closure and Cognition
Cognitive style is the consistent pattern of acquiring and processing information (Messick, 1976). People differ in
the extent to which they favor certain answers over uncertain ones (Kruglanski, 1989), and also in the extent to
which they prefer to take part in cognitive processes (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982).
Need for closure is the desire for “an answer on a given topic, any answer… compared to confusion and ambiguity”
(Kruglanski, 1990, p. 337). The term dispositional need for closure refers to people who favor certain answers,
are less cautious and considerate, accept fewer possibilities, and are more confident in making decisions compared
to people who require the avoidance of closure (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). According toWebster and Kruglanski
(1994), need for closure consists of five distinct aspects: preference for order; preference for predictability; decis-
iveness; discomfort with ambiguity; and closed-mindedness.
People not only differ in the extent to which they favor certain answers over uncertain ones, but also in the extent
to which they prefer to participate and engage in thinking. Cacioppo and Petty’s (1982) term need for cognition
aims to grasp this difference among people. Webster and Kruglanski (1994) found a low and negative correlation
between need for closure and need for cognition. The reason behind this correlation is that individuals who try to
achieve closure attempt to solve problems fast (“freezing”); thus, they engage less in thinking (Kruglanski, Peri,
& Zakai, 1991).
Need for closure is frequently associated with conservative political beliefs, authoritarianism, and dogmatism (see
Chirumbolo, 2002; Golec, 2001; Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003a,b; Kemmelmeier, 1997; Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti,
& De Grada, 2006; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Conservative beliefs and authoritarianism are closure-friendly
ways of thinking: both support stability, clarity, and order (Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003a).
However, Kossowska and Van Hiel (2003) argue that need for closure is a content-independent motivation, and
can be related to any ideology which is able to provide closure in the given social, cultural, and historical context.
In their own study, they found a negative correlation between need for closure and economic conservatism in
Poland, while the same correlation was positive in a Flemish sample. Because economic progression was the
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prevalent ideology in the long-lasting socialist era in Poland, economic progression is the closure-friendly way of
thinking there. Based on this and other findings (see Kruglanski, 1989), Kossowska and Van Hiel (2003) argue
that closure can be achieved by different contents in different contexts (e.g., leftist beliefs in the post-socialist
countries).
Authoritarianism
Authoritarian beliefs can be related to both situational and personal variables (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson,
& Sanford, 1950; Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Heaven & Bucci, 2001). People who score high on authoritarianism at
a given moment can be described as individuals who subordinate themselves to the superiors of the group, abide
by, and protect, the group’s rules and norms, and are aggressive towards individuals who disobey or endanger
these (Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996).
Dispositional need for closure is a trait-like variable that is related to authoritarian beliefs. Authoritarianism facilitates
the reduction of thinking time by offering already existing answers, which take their roots in tradition, stability, and
norms, and by doing so, help to obtain closure (Jugert, Cohrs, & Duckitt, 2009; Rokeach, 1960; Webster &
Kruglanski, 1994).
Authoritarianism in the Western European context also has a strong connection with conservative ideology and
the preference of right-wing parties, politicians, and right-wing political beliefs (Altemeyer, 1998; Crowson, Thoma,
& Hestevold, 2005; de Regt, Smits, & Mortelmans, 2011; Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2002). Pentony et al. (2000) argue
that the relationship between authoritarianism and political ideology might be different in the Eastern European
context. They found a positive correlation between authoritarianism and the preference for socialist ideology in a
Hungarian sample. McFarland, Ageyev, and Abalakina (1993) found that in the former Soviet Union the two groups
who scored the highest on authoritarianism were the members of the communist party and the members of the
extreme conservative party. Pentony and his colleagues (2000) argue that the concept of modeling might explain
these results: most adults in post-socialist countries have spent most of their life under left-wing authorities thus
“it is not surprising that authoritarians will model the left-wing in ideology and political parties if the authorities are
left-wing” (Pentony et al., 2000, p. 266). These findings also led to the rebirth of the debate about the existence
of a leftist authoritarian (Stone & Smith, 1993; Van Hiel, Duriez, & Kossowska, 2006).
The Present Research
The present research aimed to achieve two main goals. We assessed the magnitude of the relationship between
just-world beliefs, system justification, need for closure, need for cognition, and authoritarianism in a nationally
representative sample of 1000 Hungarian adults. Given the theoretical background of our study, a couple of
questions seemed highly important: (a) whether Hungarians believe in the existence of a just world and a just
system or not; (b) what is the correlation between just-world beliefs and system-justification tendencies; (c) what
is the correlation between need for closure, authoritarianism, party preference and left-right self-placement, spe-
cifically whether need for closure is a content-independent motivation or it is strongly related to conservative and
rightist ideologies; and (d) what is the correlation between system justification and need for closure?
A second aim of this study was to investigate how these psychological variables relate to political and demographic
variables. Most importantly, we wanted to see whether disadvantaged groups in Hungary accept beliefs about a
just-world and a just system, and whether there is a leftist version of authoritarianism in the Eastern European
context.
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The Political Context of Hungary in 2010
The research was conducted between February and March 2010, shortly before the national elections. The two
rounds of Hungarian parliamentary elections were held on 11th and 25th of April 2010.
In Hungary, the significant parties can unequivocally be linked to their political orientation which they integrate
into their manifesto. In the present study, parties are referred to in accordance with those orientations; namely,
MSZP as social-democrats, the coalition of two parties Fidesz-KDNP as right-wing conservatives, Jobbik as rad-
ical, far right-wing, and LMP and SZDSZ as liberals (to simplify the analysis, the two independent liberal parties,
LMP and SZDSZ, were collapsed into the category of “liberal party”). At the time of the survey, a small conservative
party, MDF, had a caucus too, but eventually they were unable to form a caucus in the new National Assembly.i
At the time of the survey, the social-democrat MSZP was the governing political force, the conservative party co-
alition Fidesz-KDNP was the major opposition party, and two smaller political parties, the liberal SZDSZ and the
conservative MDF, had parliamentary caucuses. MSZP held 186 seats, Fidesz-KDNP held 164 seats, SZDSZ
18, and MDF 11.
At the election, Fidesz-KDNPwon a two-thirds majority of seats, followed by MSZP in the second place far behind.
The newly emerging radical right-wing party Jobbik and the liberal LMP ranked third and fourth, respectively. This
means that the political situation drastically changed one month after the data recording. A right-wing government
emerged, traditional “system-changing” parties like SZDSZ and MDF were unable to form caucuses, and new
political forces (Jobbik and LMP) found their places in the National Assembly.
Method
Participants
Our study was conducted with a nationally representative sample of 1,000 Hungarian adults. Data were collected
over a two-month period from February 2010 to March 2010. We designed a stratified sample, applying the random
walking method (see Cochran, 1977) and using a quota system based on the current data of the Hungarian
Central Statistical Office.ii The strata were based on age, sex, and place of residence. Overall 3,980 Hungarian
adults were approached by trained surveyors. 1,000 face-to-face interviews were successfully conducted (25%),
1,229 people refused to participate (31%) and 1,751 people (44%) did not conform to the used quotas. The parti-
cipants were informed that the data collection was voluntary and anonymous, and that there were no right or
wrong answers. They were also informed that the data collected would be used only for scientific research purposes
and that we did not have any connection with public or non-governmental organizations other than the University
of Pécs. The participants did not receive any material compensation for their participation.
The participants were 1,000 Hungarian adults (527 females and 473 males). The mean age of the participants
was 45.4 years (SD = 16.5). A detailed description of our sample is shown in the Appendix. There are also two
Hungarian web-sites which report the full data collection and results in Hungarian language.iii Regarding political
party affiliation, our sample was very similar to the samples of public opinion polls which were conducted around
the same time by independent Hungarian polling companies (Medián, Gallup), confirming the representativeness
of our sample.
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Measures
Unless otherwise indicated below, the measures used were abridged versions of previously developed measures
and were translated into Hungarian by our research team. All items are shown in the Appendix in both English
and Hungarian language.
Just-World Beliefs
Just-world beliefs were measured by an abridged version of Dalbert’s (1999) scale. This version included eight
statements, and two sub-scales: general belief in a just world and personal belief in a just world. Participants in-
dicated their degree of agreement with each item on a 4-point scale ranging from absolutely disagree (1) to abso-
lutely agree (4).
System Justification
System justification was measured by an abridged version of Kay and Jost’s (2003) scale. This version included
six statements (e.g., “In general, you find society to be fair”). Participants indicated their agreement with each item
on a 4-point scale ranging from absolutely disagree (1) to absolutely agree (4).
Need for Closure
Need for closure was measured by an abridged version of the original need for closure scale developed by
Webster and Kruglanski (1994). The items were translated into Hungarian by Csanádi, Harsányi, and Szabó
(2009). This version included four items that represented four distinct aspects of need for closure: (a) need for
order (“I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life”), (b) decisiveness (“I tend to put off making important
decisions until the last possible moment”); (c) discomfort with ambiguity (“I do not like situations that are uncertain”);
and (d) closed-mindedness (“When thinking about a problem, I consider as many different opinions on the issue
as possible”). Participants indicated their agreement with each item on a 4-point scale ranging from absolutely
disagree (1) to absolutely agree (4).
Authoritarianism
In order to measure authoritarianism, six statements were used. Three items were selected from the original F-
scale by Adorno and his colleagues (1950). Three items were added by the authors. Participants responded to
each item on a 4-point scale ranging from absolutely disagree (1) to absolutely agree (4).
Political and Demographic Variables
Participants were asked to indicate their political orientation on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (“extreme left”) to
7 (“extreme right”). We also asked participants to indicate their party preference by answering the following
question: “Which party would you vote for if elections were held this Sunday?” Participants also indicated their
age, gender, level of education, place of residence, monthly income, and subjective economic situation (see Ap-
pendix).
Preliminary Analyses
Before proceeding with the data analysis, confirmatory factor analysis using maximum likelihood estimation was
applied in order to confirm our intended measurement model. The items were postulated to load on different latent
factors, namely general just world beliefs, personal just world beliefs, just system beliefs, need for cognition, need
Journal of Social and Political Psychology
2014, Vol. 2(1), 197–219
doi:10.5964/jspp.v2i1.208
Social Cognition and Democracy 202
for closure, and authoritarianism. No secondary loadings were specified. The suggested six-factor model yielded
poor fit indices: χ2(367) = 2062.121, p < .05, χ2/df = 5.619, GFI = .862, CFI = .745, RMSEA = .068. According to
Leach et al. (2008), the benchmark for RMSEA values is .08, and for fit indices such as GFI and CFI .930. Based
on the poor fit indices, a serious revision and re-specification of the model was needed. Four items were excluded
from the model because they loaded on their constituent factor below .40. The need for closure items did not form
a coherent factor: all but one item had a loading below .40 on the suggested latent factor (see all excluded items
in the Appendix). After the exclusion of these four items (one item from the general just world belief scale, one
from the system justification scale, and two from the authoritarianism scale) and the need for closure factor, the
now five-factor model yielded adequate fit indices: χ2(179) = 743.541, p < .05, χ2/df = 4.154, GFI = .930, CFI =
.887, RMSEA = .056. In line with the results of the confirmatory factor analysis, in the subsequent analysis we
used a three-item version of the global just world beliefs scale, a four-item version of the personal just world beliefs
scale, a five-item version of the system justification scale, a five-item version of the need for cognition scale, a
four-item version of the authoritarianism scale, and separately the four items which assess different aspects of
need for closure (need for order, decisiveness, discomfort with ambiguity, and closed-mindedness).
Results
Descriptive and Reliability Statistics and Correlations Between the Measures
As the first step of data processing, descriptive statistics were obtained concerning our main variables. Table 1
provides a summary of means, standard deviations, Cronbach’s alphas, and correlations.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics and correlations between measures (N = 1000)
987654321Measure
-1. General Just World Beliefs .02.05-.01.01.05-.06-.49**.56**
-2. Personal Just World Beliefs .14**-.001-.03.07.03.10**.36**
-3. System Justification .11**.16**-.08.03-.19-.04-
-4. Need for Cognition .47**-.05-.01.08.03-
-5. Authoritarianism .25**-.31**.11**-.29**
-6. Need for Order .27**-.23**.22**
-7. Decisiveness .03-.01-
-8. Discomfort with Ambiguity .16**-
-9. Closed-mindedness
M .731.393.502.213.103.672.841.532.302
SD .71.71.94.75.50.63.50.59.65
----α .67.75.68.80.66
*p < .05. **p < .01, two-tailed tests.
The descriptive results showed that the mean score on the system justification scale was lower than the midpoint
of the scale. Themean level of the Hungarian sample for the item “Everyone has a fair shot at wealth and happiness”
was 1.95 (SD = 0.82), which can be directly compared to Jost, Pelham, and colleagues’ (2003) findings for similar
items (“Anyone who is willing to work hard has a good chance of succeeding”, and “If people work hard enough,
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they can make a good life for themselves”). In their Northern American sample, the mean level for the sum scores
of these items was significantly above the scale mid-point of 2.5.
In accordance with the notion that just world beliefs and system justification partly overlap (Jost & Hunyady, 2005),
the two concepts were positively correlated in this sample. The global belief in a just world was more closely related
to system justification than the personal belief in a just world. Authoritarian beliefs were significantly correlated
with every aspect of need for closure: the sum score of the authoritarian items was positively correlated with need
for order and discomfort with ambiguity. There was a weak, negative relationship between authoritarianism and
decisiveness. Surprisingly, there was a negative correlation between closed-mindedness and authoritarianism.
Finally, closed-mindedness correlated negatively with need for cognition.
The Relationship Between Just World Beliefs, Just System Beliefs, Need for Cognition,
Aspects of Need for Closure, Authoritarianism, and Political/Demographic Variables
A series of multiple hierarchical regression analyses were conducted in order to test the relationships between
our main variables and various political and demographic variables. In each regression analysis, a main variable
(general belief in a just world, personal belief in a just world, just system beliefs, need for closure, the four aspects
of need for cognition, and authoritarianism) was entered as the dependent variable, while the political and
demographic variables were entered as predictor variables (and in some cases items which were measuring
cognitive style as a third set of variables). Place of residence, party affiliation, and level of education were dummy-
coded for all analyses. For party affiliation we used four dummy variables and Fidesz-KDNP was the reference
category. The four dummy variables were MSZP (social-democrat party), Liberal parties (SZDSZ and LMP),
Jobbik (far right-wing party), and one category for people who did not want to answer, were uncertain, chose
“other party”, or did not have the intention to vote. We decided to omit the predictor variable “income” because
194 participants did not reveal this information. The inclusion of this variable in the analyses would have led to a
sample of 806 participants instead of 1,000 participants. We were still able to measure our participants’ economic
situation with another variable that assessed the subjective economic situation of our participants (“subjective
economic situation”). Three values were created for this variable: “good subjective economic situation” (“I do not
have any financial problem”, “I do not have financial problems, but I have to live within my means”), “moderate
subjective economic situation” (“I can’t buy everything I want, and usually run out of money before the end of the
month”), and “poor subjective economic situation” (“I have serious financial troubles”) Subjective economic situation
was a dummy variable in the analyses and “poor economic situation” was used as the reference category. For
age and left-right self-placement we also measured the non-linear, quadratic effects. In order to do this, both
variables were centered before creating the quadratic terms.
Demographic variables (place of residence, gender, age, level of education, subjective economic situation) were
entered first in the model and the political variables (political party affiliation, left-right self-placement) second.
When authoritarianism was the dependent variable, we also entered need for cognition and the four items of need
for closure in a third step. When system justification was the dependent variable, need for cognition, the need for
closure items, and authoritarianism were all entered as predictor variables in the third step. These additional steps
were intended to examine whether the impact of cognitive style on authoritarianism and the impact of authoritari-
anism on system justification are culture-specific or universal phenomena.
Table 2 provides the results of the multiple hierarchical regression analyses for general just world beliefs and
personal just world beliefs. Six significant predictors were identified for general beliefs in a just world, and five
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significant predictors were found for personal beliefs in a just world. Participants’ subjective economic situation
was the most powerful predictor: people who evaluated their economic situation as good or moderate believed
in the existence of a general and personal just world more than people who considered their economic situation
poor. Participants who did not live in the capital had lower scores in both scales than participants whose place of
residence was Budapest. Educated participants had stronger beliefs in the existence of a general and personal
just world. Older participants had higher scores in personal just world belief. Interestingly, voters of Jobbik, the
far right political party of Hungary, had lower scores on general just world beliefs, but not on personal just world
beliefs.
Table 2
Multiple Regression Analyses After the Second Set of Predictors (Political Predictors) Were Added to the Model. Dependent Variables: General
Just World Beliefs and Personal Just World Beliefs (N = 1000)
Personal Just World BeliefsGeneral Just World Beliefs
Variables βSEbβSEb
(Constant) .104.4872.114.2922
Gender .032-.037.038-.056-.041.072-
Age Linear .274**-.004.010-.220-.005.009-
Age Quadratic .229.000.000.219.000.000
Secondary School .022.042.027.064.046.086
University Degree .080*.060.137.084*.066.158
City with County’s Rights .064-.061.094-.094*-.067.152-
City .062-.056.080-.105*-.061.147-
Village .099*-.055.125-.067-.061.093-
Moderate Economic Situation .233**.064.280.160**.070.210
Good Economic Situation .336**.065.398.245**.071.318
Left-Right Self-Placement Linear .089.023.031.100.025.038
Left-Right Self-Placement Quadratic .021-.013.004-.004.015.001
Jobbik Voters .000.062.000.104**-.068.204-
LMP-SZDSZ Voters .035-.117.124-.018-.128.069-
MSZP Voters .043-.079.086-.051-.087.113-
Party Affiliation Not Known .050-.045.061-.035-.050.046-
R
2
= .067, F (16, 983) = 4.411, p < .01R
2
= .063, F (16, 983) = 4.102, p < .01Model Summary
*p < .05. **p < .01, two-tailed tests.
Table 3 provides the results of the multiple hierarchical regression analysis for need for cognition. Level of education,
subjective economic situation, and gender had positive effects on need for cognition, whereas age had a negative
effect. As expected, people with higher levels of education tended to engage in information processing more than
people with lower levels of education. Male participants and younger participants also had a higher need for
cognition, and people whose economic situation was better (compared to female participants, older participants,
and people whose economic situation was worse).
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Table 3
Multiple Regression Analysis After the Second Set of Predictors (Political Predictors) Were Added to the Model. Dependent Variable: Need
for Cognition (N = 1000)
Need for Cognition
Variables βSEb
(Constant) .103.2432
Gender .102**.037.128
Age Linear .012-.004.000
Age Quadratic .094-.000.000
Secondary School .196**.042.253
University Degree .310**.059.564
City with County’s Rights .067.060.104
City .114**.056.154
Village .010.055.013
Moderate Economic Situation .113*.063.144
Good Economic Situation .125*.065.156
Left-Right Self-Placement Linear .095-.022.035-
Left-Right Self-Placement Quadratic .047.013.010
Jobbik Voters .063.065.102
LMP-SZDSZ Voters .024.116.090
MSZP Voters .029.079.062
Party Affiliation Not Known .004.045.006
R
2
=.179, F (16, 983) = 13.383, p <.01Model Summary
*p < .05. **p < .01, two-tailed tests.
Table 4 provides the results of the multiple hierarchical regression analyses for need for order and decisiveness,
and Table 5 for discomfort with ambiguity and closed-mindedness. Age, place of residence, and subjective eco-
nomic situation were consistent predictors of different aspects of need for closure. Younger participants scored
significantly lower on need for order, decisiveness, and discomfort with ambiguity. Participants who evaluated
their subjective economic situation as good or moderate scored higher on need for order and decisiveness than
participants who evaluated their subjective economic situation as poor. However, poor economic situation was
positively related to closed-mindedness. Place of residence was a significant predictor for all aspects of need for
closure; participants who lived in Budapest had significantly lower scores on need for order and discomfort with
ambiguity, and had higher scores on decisiveness. Somewhat surprisingly, participants who lived in the capital
had also higher scores on closed-mindedness. We found a weak but significant curvilinear effect of left-right self-
placement on need for order. To demonstrate this effect we created two categories: “non-extreme left-right self-
placement” (values between 2 and 6) and “extreme left-right self-placement” (values 1 and 7), and compared the
mean level of need for order for these two groups. People who placed themselves in the “extreme left” or “extreme
right” category (N = 273) scored higher on need for control (M = 3.33, SD = 0.68) than the “non-extreme” group
(M = 3.18, SD = 0.77, N = 727), t(998) = -0.242, p < .05.
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Table 4
Multiple Regression Analyses After the Second Set of Predictors (Political Predictors) Were Added to the Model. Dependent Variables: Need
for Order and Decisiveness (N = 1000)
DecisivenessNeed for Order
Variables βSEbβSEb
(Constant) .164.7521.129.2652
Gender .029.059.054.025-.046.038-
Age Linear .189**.007.011.405**.005.018
Age Quadratic .014-.000.000.189-.000.000
Secondary School .087*.066.167.034.052.052
University Degree .055.095.149.040.074.087
City with County’s Rights .036.096.083.157**.075.292
City .045-.088.091-.109*.069.177
Village .081-.088.163-.208**.069.333
Moderate Economic Situation .158**.101.300.099.079.150
Good Economic Situation .210**.103.393.101.081.150
Left-Right Self-Placement Linear .055-.036.030-.103-.048.051-
Left-Right Self-Placement Quadratic .065.021.021.185**.017.049
Jobbik Voters .009-.097.026-.053.076.119
LMP-SZDSZ Voters .021-.184.122-.020-.145.090-
MSZP Voters .028.125.088.007.099.019
Party Affiliation Not Known .024.071.045.072.056.109
R
2
= .068, F (16, 983) = 4.457, p < .01R
2
= .096, F (16, 983) = 6.497, p < .01Model Summary
*p < .05. **p < .01, two-tailed tests.
Table 6 provides the results of the multiple hierarchical regression analysis for system justification and authoritari-
anism. Both regression analyses had three sets of predictor variables: demographic variables, political variables,
and finally cognitive style for authoritarianism, and cognitive style and authoritarianism for system justification.
Authoritarianism was predicted by level of education and cognitive style. Level of education was a negative pre-
dictor: the more educated the participant was the less he or she held authoritarian beliefs. Need for order and
discomfort with ambiguity were positive predictors of authoritarianism, while decisiveness and closed mindedness
were negative predictors. Political party preference was not a significant predictor: the mean level of authoritari-
anism score was above the mid-point of the scale for all sub-samples and very similar among people with different
party affiliation (MFidesz-KDNP = 3.08, SD = 0.48;MJobbik = 3.19, SD = 0.51;MMSZP = 3.11, SD = 0.52;MLMP-SZDSZ
= 3.00, SD = 0.48). We found a weak but significant curvilinear effect of left-right self-placement on authoritarianism.
People who placed themselves in the “extreme left” or “extreme right” category (N = 273) scored higher on author-
itarianism (M = 3.16, SD = 0.51) than the “non-extreme” group (M = 3.07, SD = 0.77, N = 727), t(998) = -2.15, p
< .05.
Journal of Social and Political Psychology
2014, Vol. 2(1), 197–219
doi:10.5964/jspp.v2i1.208
Kelemen, Szabó, Mészáros et al. 207
Table 5
Multiple Regression Analyses After the Second Set of Predictors (Political Predictors) Were Added to the Model. Dependent Variables:
Discomfort with Ambiguity and Closed-mindedness (N = 1000)
Closed-mindednessDiscomfort with Ambiguity
Variables βSEbβSEb
(Constant) .125.0742.125.0833
Gender .067*.045.096.037-.045.052-
Age Linear .005-.005.000.069*.005.003
Age Quadratic .013.000.000.010.000.000
Secondary School .055-.050.080-.014-.050.020-
University Degree .098**-.072.203-.035-.072.072-
City with County’s Rights .072-.073.128-.023.073.041
City .131**-.067.201-.206**.067.317
Village .107*-.067.163-.152**.067.230
Moderate Economic Situation .152**-.077.217-.059.077.084
Good Economic Situation .172**-.078.243-.038.078.053
Left-Right Self-Placement Linear .022-.027.009-.050.027.021
Left-Right Self-Placement Non-Linear .030-.016.008-.068.016.017
Jobbik Voters .068*-.074.145-.011-.074.024-
LMP-SZDSZ Voters .018-.140.077-.011-.074.024-
MSZP Voters .113**.095.272.032-.095.078-
Party Affiliation Not Known .054.054.078.029-.054.042-
R
2
= .062, F (16, 983) = 4.078, p < .01R
2
= .055, F (16, 983) = 3.599, p < .01Model Summary
*p < .05. **p < .01, two-tailed tests.
System justification was predicted by party preference, subjective economic situation, level of education, place
of residence, and cognitive style. Voters of Jobbik, the far-right political party of Hungary, displayed lower levels
of system justification than voters of Fidesz-KDNP, the conservative right political party (MJobbik = 1.66, SD =
0.47;MFidesz-KDNP = 1.83, SD = 0.47), and MSZP, the left social democrat party (MMSZP = 1.97, SD = 0.51). Voters
of MSZP scored significantly higher on system justification than voters of Fidesz-KDNP. Voters of liberal parties
have similar mean level scores as voters of MSZP (MLMP-SZDSZ = 1.96, SD = 0.51). More educated participants
and participants who had a better subjective economic situation also justified the current establishment more than
less educated participants and participants who had a worse subjective economic situation. People who lived in
villages had significantly lower scores than people who lived in the capital. Discomfort with ambiguity was a neg-
ative predictor of system justification, while closed-mindedness was a positive predictor.
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Table 6
Multiple Regression Analyses After the Third Set of Predictors (Cognitive Style for Authoritarianism and Cognitive Style and Authoritarianism
for System Justification) Were Added to the Model. Dependent Variables: Authoritarianism and System Justification (N = 1000)
System JustificationAuthoritarianism
Variables βSEbβSEb
(Constant) .192.3752.156.8122
Gender .032-.031.032-.017.029.017
Age Linear .104-.004.004-.102-.003.003-
Age Quadratic .155.000.000.177.000.000
Secondary School .029.035.030.058-.033.060-
University Degree .085*.052.124.081*-.048.118-
City with County’s Rights .073-.050.091-.049-.047.061-
City .054-.047.059-.026.044.028
Village .086*-.046.093-.023-.043.024-
Moderate Economic Situation .136**.053.138.032-.049.033-
Good Economic Situation .291**.054.292.029-.051.029-
Left-Right Self-Placement Linear .065.019.019.032-.017.033-
Left-Right Self-Placement Non-Linear .075-.011.013-.117*.010.021
Jobbik Voters .084*-.051.128-.048.047.073
LMP-SZDSZ Voters .019.095.059.000-.089.001-
MSZP Voters .068.065.116.009.061.015
Party Affiliation Not Known .012.037.013.038.035.039
Need for Cognition .052-.030.041-.095**-.028.076-
Need for Order .057.023.038.212**.021.142
Decisiveness .020.017.011.162**-.016.086-
Discomfort with Ambiguity .115**-.023.081-.205**.021.145
Closed-Mindedness .062.026.044.219**-.024.155-
---Authoritarianism .087-.038.072-
R
2
= .135, F (22, 977) = 6.920, p < .01R
2
= .235, F (21, 978) = 14.308, p < .01Model Summary
*p < .05. **p < .01, two-tailed tests.
Discussion
The main objective of this study was to investigate the relationship between psychological variables (general and
personal just world beliefs, just system beliefs, need for cognition, need for closure, and authoritarianism) and
also their relationship with various political and demographic variables in a post-socialist context. Political sociology
and political psychology have always been open to the possibility that some phenomena might function differently
in different cultures (Pentony et al., 2000). Central/Eastern European samples are excellent subjects to test this
possibility (see also Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum, 2002; Duriez, Van Hiel, & Kossowska,
2005).
The core finding of this study is that Hungarian people in general do not justify the current establishment. This
result is in conflict with both the original version of system justification (all social groups participate in system jus-
tification in one way or another) and the “stronger” version of the theory (due to cognitive dissonance, the most
disadvantaged groups justify the system the most; Jost, Pelham, et al., 2003). The mean level of system justification
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was quite low in the overall sample (below the mid-point of the scale), but real criticism of the system comes from
the disadvantaged groups such as the voters of the political opposition (voters of conservative right-wing and far
right political parties), less educated people, those who have bad economic conditions, and those who live in
small cities and villages.
It seems that system justification is considerably weaker in Hungary than in its Western counterparts: in Western
European and North American samples the mean level of system justification is usually significantly higher than
the mid-point of the scale (e.g., Carter et al., 2011; Jost, Pelham, et al., 2003; van der Toorn et al., 2010), while
in our representative sample the mean level of system justification was significantly lower than the mid-point of
the scale.
Given the descriptive nature of the data, one can only speculate about the possible explanations underlying the
lack of system justification in this representative Hungarian sample. One not too distant explanation relates to the
time frame of our study: the data were collected shortly before the national parliamentary elections so the system
was in a period of possible change. However, we believe that this possibility can only offer a limited explanation
for our results. First, statements regarding system justification did not directly focus on the current government,
but were related to the perceived justness of general social conditions in Hungary that might be understood in the
framework of a relatively new democratic system in the specific political context. Second, the upcoming elections
cannot explain the fact that supporters of the governing party did not justify the system either (voters of MSZP,
the ruling party, had a significantly lower score than the mid-point of the scale). Furthermore, the findings are in
harmony with the results of the few surveys from Eastern/Central European countries concerning system justific-
ation, and to our knowledge, these studies were not conducted prior to national elections. Based on our findings
and on the findings of Wojciszke et al. (2008), Kay et al. (2009), van der Toorn et al. (2010), there is reliable
evidence that the Polish and Hungarians do not justify the system and do not view it as legitimate. Post-socialist
societies are in the middle of an unfinished transition from socialism to democracy. Kreidl (2000) suggests that
the separation from the socialist ideal of equality has not occurred yet, thus growing economic and social inequal-
ities are understood to be unjust. Probably the most significant difference between the socialist and capitalist
systems is to be found in the choice of preferred values: equality or merit. Such differences in values directly in-
fluence the extent to which the system is perceived as just or unjust. For example, in a country which has been
a capitalist democracy for a long time, like the United States, merit-based rewarding is more preferable than the
idea of equality. People have to be rewarded in accordance with their efforts and/or their abilities to perceive the
system as just (Jost & Kay, 2010). The situation is very different in the case of a post-socialist country such as
Hungary. The communist state clearly stressed equality over merit, and so citizens of post-communist countries
were socialized in a system which preferred equality to merit. Citizens of post-socialist states generally consider
the perceived large economic inequalities unjust, and as a result, they question the system as well.
We believe that even the above-mentioned reason is only a partial explanation for the almost total lack of system
justification in the representative Hungarian sample, which included young people who did not undergo socialization
in the communist era. These young people did not justify the system more than older respondents as age was
not a significant predictor of holding just-system beliefs. So to arrive at a fuller explanation, one has to turn to the
historical trajectory of the Hungarian group and to the collective identity based on this historical trajectory (László,
2013). In the Hungarian history, after the defeat suffered in the battle of Mohács in 1526 against the Ottoman
army, long centuries of occupation followed. First the Turkish empire, then the Habsburgs, the Germans, and finally
the Soviets ruled the country. The cultural nation was organized against a hostile, alien, and unjust system, as
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opposed to the Western model, where the development of the nation and the state progressed hand in hand. Bar-
Tal (2000) and László (2003) argue that the history of a group acts as an orientating force for group members. It
organizes experiences and providesmeanings. For Hungarians, recurrent historical experiences suggest that instead
of people’s interest, the system (the state and its representativeness) boast alien and selfish interests. Under the
conditions of a newly established democracy, frustrations of the expectations on a better life may strengthen distrust
and hostility toward the system. Both general and personal beliefs in a just world moderately correlated with system
justification, suggesting that these concepts are related to but distinguishable from each other.
The mean level of authoritarianism was quite high in the overall sample. Older and less educated participants
had higher authoritarianism scores compared to younger and more educated participants. As predicted, cognitive
style and left-right self-placement were significant predictors of authoritarian beliefs. Need for cognition (preference
to engage in thinking) was a significant predictor of authoritarianism, while different aspects of need for closure
related differently to authoritarianism: need for order and discomfort with ambiguity were positive predictors, while
decisiveness and closed-mindedness were negative predictors. People who do not like to engage in thinking,
prefer an unambiguous and structured way of life, and have difficulties of decision making were more likely to
have authoritarian beliefs. This result is in accordance with the findings of Western samples (Kruglanski et al.,
2006; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Most of the authoritarian beliefs are based on stability, tradition, and order,
so they can be perceived as an “easy way out”. The nature of these beliefs can help to facilitate the process of
obtaining closure (Jugert et al., 2009; Rokeach, 1960; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). The relationship between
authoritarianism and left-right self-placement was non-linear: participants who considered themselves “extreme”
(either left or right) had significantly higher scores on authoritarianism than non-extreme participants. There is
debate about the so-called “extremity hypothesis”, which suggests that political leftists share the same character-
istics (e.g., rigidity, dogmatic adherence) as political rightist and that the two extremes are more similar to each
other than either of them to non-extreme left-right ideology (Greenberg & Jonas, 2003; Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003b;
Thorisdottir, Jost, Liviatan, & Shrout, 2007). Political leftists in our sample had similar authoritarianism scores,
and also need for order scores, as political rightists. However, these results have to be interpreted very cautiously
as there were only seven participants in the “extreme left” category.
Another goal of the study was to examine the relationship between two dimensions of cognitive style (need for
closure and need for cognition). Similarly to the results in Western samples (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994), we
found a significant moderate, negative correlation between closed-mindedness and need for cognition. Discomfort
with ambiguity, need for order, and decisiveness were not related to need for cognition.
In addition to these findings, the study also provided insight into the relationships between psychological variables
and various demographic and political variables. Economic situation, level of education, and place of residence
were the most important predictors of the phenomena investigated. Participants who considered themselves in
a bad economic situation believed in a just world and just system to a lesser extent than other participants. Bad
economic situation was also negatively related to need for cognition, and positively to closed-mindedness. Levels
of education predicted significantly many aspects of cognitive style (need for cognition, decisiveness, closed-
mindedness). Place of residence was a significant predictor for all variables except authoritarianism. Age played
an important role in having need for closure and authoritarian beliefs: older participants tended to show higher
need for order, decisiveness, and discomfort with ambiguity, and they were more likely to agree with authoritarian
statements than younger participants. Most of these results are in harmony with the results obtained previously
in Western samples.
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The main limitation of the present study is that it used a cross-national survey design, which can observe only
correlations and does not tell much about causal effects. Therefore one should be cautious with any hypothesis
about a possible causal link between the measured variables (e.g., between cognitive style and authoritarianism).
An additional limitation relates to the weaknesses of the measurement model: three scales in our study had low
reliability, and the items of need for closure did not form a coherent factor. Also the items which assessed author-
itarian beliefs should be revised in subsequent studies, and we should use more common measures of authorit-
arianism such as the RWA (Altemeyer, 1996) in the future. Although in our regression models we found many
significant predictors, the total variance explained by these predictors was quite low. This suggests that there are
more important but yet unidentified predictors of the examined phenomena. For example, we did not measure
values in our study, especially the values of equity and merit. Van der Toorn and her colleagues (2010) suggest
that the perceptions of fairness is a strong predictor of system justification, and there is empirical evidence that
Hungarian people do not think that this newmerit-based system is fair (Fülöp, 2008). Including additional predictors
(e.g., Schwartz’s value scale, 1992, 1994, 2006; conservative beliefs, Kossowska & Van Hiel, 2003) should improve
the explanatory power of our model.
In sum, our results support the notion that cultural universalism and cultural differences emerge simultaneously
when it comes to psychological variables such as just-world beliefs, system justification, need for cognition, need
for closure, and authoritarianism. Many of our findings are similar to findings obtained inWestern samples. However,
notable cultural differences were found as well. Most importantly, Hungarians hold just-world and just-system
beliefs to a lesser extent than people living in Western democracies. Our stratified nationally representative sample
can be characterized by “system derogation” and not “system justification”: the belief that the social and political
system is inherently unfair, unjust, and corrupt.
Notes
i) MSZP = Hungarian Socialist Party, FIDESZ = Hungarian Civic Alliance, KDNP = Christian Democratic People’s Party,
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Hungarian Liberal Party, MDF = Hungarian Democratic Forum
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Appendix
Description of the sample
The participants were 1,000 Hungarian adults (527 females and 473 males). The mean age of the participants was 45.4 years
(SD = 16.5).
Place of residence
• Budapest, the capital of Hungary (N = 176)
• City with county’s rights (N = 201)
• City (N = 304)
• Village (N = 319)
Level of education
• Less than 8 years of education (N = 47)
• Finished primary school (N = 436)
• Finished secondary school (N = 380)
• Finished college (N = 100)
• Finished university (N = 37)
Subjective economic situation
• I do not have any financial problem (N = 19)
• I do not have financial problems, but I have to live within my means (N = 457)
• I can’t buy everything I want, and usually run out of money before the end of the month (N = 421)
• I have serious financial troubles (N = 103)
Objective economic situation
• Less than 50,000 Hungarian Forints (HUF) per months (approximately 167 EUROS) (N = 199)
• Between 50,001 HUF and 200,000 HUF per months (N = 582)
• More than 200,001 HUF per months (approximately 667 EUROS) (N = 25)
• I do not know / I do not want to answer (N = 194)
Political party affiliation
• Fidesz, conservative right party (N = 334)
• Jobbik, far-right party (N = 124)
• LMP, liberal party (N = 26)
• MDF, conservative right party (N = 14)
• MSZP, social democrat party (N = 95)
• SZDSZ, liberal party (N = 2)
• Other party (N = 10)
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• Do not want to answer (N = 206)
• Do not know (uncertain) (N = 177)
• Will not vote (N = 5)
Items of the scales
General just world beliefs
• I think basically the world is a just place / Azt gondolom, hogy a világ alapvetően egy igazságos hely.
• I believe that, by and large, people get what they deserve / Az emberek az életben általában azt kapják, amit
megérdemelnek.
• I am confident that justice always prevails over injustice / Biztos vagyok benne, hogy az igazság mindig győzedelmeskedik
az igazságtalanság fölött.
• I firmly believe that injustices in all areas of life are the exception rather than the rule / Szilárd meggyőződésem, hogy az
igazságtalanságok az élet minden területén inkább kivételnek, mintsem általánosnak számítanak. (excluded item)
Personal just world beliefs
• I believe that I usually get what I deserve / Általában azt kapom, amit megérdemlek.
• I think that important decisions that are made concerning me are usually just / A velem kapcsolatban hozott fontos döntések
általában igazságosak.
• In my life injustice is the exception rather than the rule / Az életben velem történő igazságtalanságok inkább kivételnek,
mintsem általánosnak számítanak.
• I believe that most of the things that happen in my life are fair / A legtöbb dolog, ami az életemben velem történik helyénvaló.
System justification scale
• In general, I find society to be fair / Úgy gondolom, hogy a magyar társadalom tisztességes.
• Hungarian society needs to be radically restructured / A magyar gazdasági és társadalmi szerkezetet gyökeresen át
kellene alakítani.
• Most policies serve the greater good / A legtöbb hazai politikai döntés a közjót szolgálja.
• Everyone has a fair shot at wealth and happiness / Magyarországon mindenkinek megvan a lehetősége a gazdagodásra
és a boldogságra.
• Our society is getting worse every year / Társadalmunk állapota minden évben egyre rosszabb. (reverse-coded item)
• Hungary is the best country in the world to live in / Számomra a világon legszebb hely Magyarország. (excluded item)
Need for cognition
• I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a change I will have to think in depth about something / Kerülöm a
sok gondolkodást igénylő helyzeteket. (reverse-coded item)
• The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me / Szeretek elvont, absztrakt módon gondolkodni.
• It’s enough for me that something gets the job done, I don’t care how or why it works / Számomra elég az, ha valami
működik, nem igazán foglalkoztat, hogy miért és hogyan. (reverse-coded item)
• I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems / Élvezem az olyan feladatokat, amelyekben
új megoldásokat lehet találni egy problémára.
• I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me personally / Gyakran gondolkodom olyan
problémákról is, amelyek személyesen nem érintenek engem.
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Need for closure
• I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life / Szeretem a rendezett és világosan lefektetett szabályok szerinti életet.
• I tend to put off making important decisions until the last possible moment / Gyakran az utolsó pillanatban hozok meg
fontos döntéseket. (reverse-coded item)
• I do not like situations that are uncertain / Nem szeretem a bizonytalan szituációkat.
• When thinking about a problem, I consider as many different opinions on the issue as possible / Amikor egy problémán
gondolkodom, akkor a lehetséges legtöbb megoldást számba veszem. (reverse-coded item)
Authoritarianism
• Everybody has to know his or her place in life in terms of both superiority and inferiority / Az életben mindenkinek tudnia
kell, hogy hol a helye, ki van felette és ki van alatta.
• It is both important to know how to obey and how to command / Fontos, hogy az ember tudjon engedelmeskedni és
parancsolni is, ha szükség van rá.
• People can be divided into two distinct classes: the weak and the strong / Az embereket két csoportra lehet osztani:
gyengékre és erősekre.
• Human nature being what it is, there will always be war and conflict / Az emberi természet olyan, amilyen, ezért mindig
is lesznek háborúk.
• Some day it will probably be shown that astrology can explain a lot of things / Egyszer még ki fog derülni, hogy az
asztrológia nagyon sok mindent megmagyaráz az életben. (excluded item)
• I would rather be told what to do than come up with my own decision every time / Jobban szeretem, ha valaki megmondja,
hogy mit kell tennem, mintha nekem kellene mindenről döntenem. (excluded item)
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